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SERVICE BY MAIL PROVISIONS OF CALIFORNIA'S
NEW JURISDICTION STATUTE
July 1, 1970, the friendly neighborhood mailman unwittingly as-
sumes a new role-quasi process server. Service of summons by mail
is authorized by California's new statute, which revises the law related
to jurisdiction and service of process. The provisions for service by
mail are entirely new; formerly, a natural person could only be served
personally,' or as a last resort, by publication.2 Use of the mail,
however, is by no means revolutionary-the law recognizes mail
as a valid means of communication, other states allow limited service
by mail, and California law has heretofore authorized use of the mail in
various contexts. Nevertheless, California's law is unique. No other
state has so sweepingly and absolutely authorized this mode of service.
California has approached the problem of service in its modem con-
text. Unhindered by antiquated formulations, the legislature has
provided for a convenient and fair method of service, giving due regard
to both the needs of the plaintiff and the interests of the defendant.
The New Mailing Provisions
The new law has two provisions for service by mail: section
415.30 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a general provision applicable
both within and without the state; and section 415.40, applicable only
outside of the state. Section 415.30 provides for delivery of summons
by first-class mail or by airmail. In addition to the summons, the
person being served must be sent a copy of the complaint, two copies of
the notice,3 an acknowledgement of a receipt of summons, and a post-
paid return envelope addressed to the sender. The acknowledgment is
the form which the person served must sign and return within 20 days
after the mailing of the summons. Service is deemed complete on the
date the acknowledgment is executed, if it is later returned to the
sender. The acknowledgment of receipt must be returned for service
1. Cal. Stat. 1968, ch. 132, § 2, at 345, CAL. CODE Cirv. PRoc. § 411(3), (4), (8)
(effective until July 1, 1970).
2. Cal. Stat. 1968, ch. 132, § 3, at 346, CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 412 (effective
until July 1, 1970).
3. Some terms of the notice are as follows: 'This summons is served pursuant
to Section 415.30 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. Failure to complete this
form and return it to sender within 20 days may subject you... to liability for the
payment of any expenses incurred in serving a summons upon you in any other manner
permitted by law." CAL. CODE Civ. PROc. § 415.30(b) (operative July 1, 1970).
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to be valid. If a person fails to answer a properly mailed summons
within the 20 days "without good cause shown," he is liable for "rea-
sonable expenses thereafter incurred in serving or attempting to serve
the party by another method."
Under section 415.40 a summons may be served on a person out-
side the state4 by sending copies of the summons and complaint to the
person being served by any form of airmail requiring a return receipt.
5
Service is deemed complete on the 10th day after mailing. 6
The Changes Made by the New Law
The new mailing provisions represent one of the substantial
changes made by Senate Bill 503. The legislature entirely rewrote the
sections pertaining to service. Under the new law five modes of serv-
ice are authorized: personal service;7 substituted service to a specified
person at the defendant's place of business or usual place of abode;8
service by first-class mail,9 service by registered or certified airmail;"°
and service by publication." Under the former law, personal service
was the principal means of serving a summons,'12 and there was no gen-
eral provision for service by mail. Despite the significant change, the
Judicial Council points out that the new sections "do not represent a
radical innovation."' 3
4. The Judicial Council points out: "This form of service may be used to de-
liver process only to a person who is outside this state . . . . [But] process may
eventually be forwarded and in fact delivered to the addressee within this state" in
certain cases. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 410.40 Judicial Council Comment (operative
July 1, 1970).
5. "Both registered and certified airmail, return receipt requested, meet this
requirement." Id.
6. This determines the time when the 30 day period begins, in which the de-
fendant must file responsive pleading, as prescribed by CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 412.20
(a) (3). However, it does not mean that service is necessarily good.
7. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 415.10 (operative July 1, 1970).
8. Id. § 415.20. However, a copy of the complaint and the summons must
thereafter be sent by first-class mail to the person being served at the place where the
complaint and summons were left.
9. Id. § 415.30.
10. Id. § 415.40.
11. Id. § 415.50. This section applies only if the party cannot be served by one
of the methods listed in the text accompanying notes 7-10 supra.
12. Cal. Stat. 1968, ch. 132, § 3, at 346, CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 411(8) (effective
until July 1, 1970). If personal service could not be made with reasonable diligence,
service by publication was authorized. Cal. Stat. 1968, ch. 132, § 2, at 345, CAL. CODE
CV. PROC. § 412 (effective until July 1, 1970).
13. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALuORNIA, 1969 REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE
LEGISLATURE 29.
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Use of the Mail in the Past
Using the mail as an authorized means of notice is not a new'
idea. Past California legislation has recognized the mail as an efficient
means of communication. 14 Any notice required by law, and not other-
wise provided for in the codes, may be given by registered letter, 5 and
California specifically authorizes the use of mail for notices and court
papers.' 0 California also has provisions for service of process by mail
in certain limited situations. Such service is appropriate in the small
claims court.'7 Furthermore, under California's limited long-arm stat-
utes, provision is made for service of summons on the fictitious agents
within the state of foreign corporations, nonresident aviators and non-
resident motorists, followed with notice to the defendant by mail.' 8
Under these various provisions, the efficacy of the mail as a
means of notice has never been successfully disputed. However, Cali-
fornia courts do recognize the possibility of abusing the convenience
and thus have required strict compliance with the statutes. 9 For ex-
ample, in a recent case 20 construing a notice by mail provision,21 the
court observed that "[i]n making service by mail there must be strict
compliance [with the code sections]. 22  Cases under the Vehicle Code
also indicate the courts' disposition in favor of strict statutory compli-
ance.23  In Weisfeld v. Superior Court,24 the copy of the summons was
sent to the defendant's parents, and the defendant's mother received
14. CAL. EVID. CODE § 641: "A letter correctly addressed and properly mailed is
presumed to have been received in the ordinary course of mail."
15. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1020.
16. Id. §§ 1012-13a.
17. Id. § 117(c).
18. CAL. CODE Crv. PRoc. § 411(2); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 3301, 6501-02; CAL.
PUB. UTI-. CODE § 21414; CAL. Vms. CODE § 17454-55. Although service under these
statutes is on a fictitious agent, notice to the defendant by mail is the essential part of
the process. Under the new law, California will have a general long-arm statute. CAL.
CODE CIv. PROc. § 410.10 (operative July 1, 1970); see note 52 infra.
19. E.g., Valley Vista Land Co. v. Nipomo Water & Sewer Co., 255 Cal. App. 2d
172, 63 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1967).
20. Forslund v. Forslund, 225 Cal. App. 2d 476, 37 Cal. Rptr. 489 (1964) (in-
volving notice of an application for modifying a prior custody order in a divorce
proceeding).
21. CAL. CODE Crv. PROc. §§ 1011-13a; see note 16 & accompanying text supra.
22. 225 Cal. App. 2d at 485, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 495.
23. Weisfeld v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. App. 2d 148, 242 P.2d 29 (1952); cf.
Coulston v. Cooper, 245 Cal. App. 2d 866, 54 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1966); Varra v. Superior
Court, 181 Cal. App. 2d 12, 4 Cal. Rptr. 920 (1960). Mailing provisions were not at
issue in the latter two cases, but they do illustrate the courts' reluctance to exercise
jurisdiction in the absence of strict statutory compliance.
24. 110 Cal. App. 2d 148, 242 P.2d 29 (1952).
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and signed for the registered letter. This was held not to be adequate
service to give the court jurisdiction:
The general rule is that a court may not acquire jurisdiction in
personam over a nonresident defendant in an action by service
of notice or other process outside the territory or state in which
the forum exists. . . . When jurisdiction is sought to be obtained
by a prescribed form of constructive service the statutory condi-
tions on which the service depends must be strictly observed.
Unless the statute has been complied with, there is no power to
render a judgment. 25
Judging by precedent, it is likely that the courts will be equally strict
with the new mailing provisions.
Mailing Statutes in Other States
Several states provide for service of process by mail, but only in
limited situations. In states where it is authorized, service by mail is
frequently (1) authorized only for nonresidents or persons out of the
state, either directly26 or through an agent; 27 (2) limited to particular
courts;28 (3) limited to certain proceedings;29 (4) authorized only
when other service, after due diligence, has failed; 0 or (5) used in
conjunction with other modes of serviceA1 Since no state has an un-
qualified provision comparable to California's,32 cases from other juris-
dictions have limited relevance as aids in interpreting the California
mailing provisions. An examination of some typical cases from other
states, however, does indicate possible areas of litigation.
In a case 3  decided under the New York "nail and mail" statute, 4
a summons mailed to the "last known address" of a defendant who
had moved from that address was held to be insufficient notice. The
statute was held to require that the summons be delivered to the de-
fendant's actual residence. The language of California's new law seem-
ingly requires the same interpretation.3 5 Since acknowledgment of re-
25. Id. at 151, 242 P.2d at 31-32.
26. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. Rule 4(e)(2)(a) (Supp. 1969).
27. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.161 (1969); MIcH. COMP. LAws ANm. § 600.1913(1) (a)
(1968).
28. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2703.23 (Page 1954).
29. COLO. REV. STAT. Rule 4(g) (1963) (in rem proceedings).
30. N.J. COURT RULES, Rule 4:4-(4)(j) (1969).
31. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 308(3) (McKinney 1963).
32. See text accompanying notes 43-46 infra.
33. Entwistle v. Stone, 53 Misc. 2d 227, 278 N.Y.S.2d 19 (Sup. Ct. Onodaga
County 1967).
34. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 308(3). The statute requires that the summons be
affixed to the residence of the defendant and a copy be mailed to the same address.
35. Both section 415.30 and section 415.40 require that the summons be mailed
"to the person to be served," not to his last known address.
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ceipt of summons is required by the new law, the requirement of de-
livery to defendant's actual residence will probably be significant only
in situations arising under section 415.30(d), where the defendant de-
nies liability for the cost of a subsequent mode of service. 6 A showing
by the defendant that the summons was sent to his "last known address"
and that he did not reside at that address when the summons was sent
would undoubtedly satisfy the requirement of showing good cause for
failure to acknowledge the mailed summons.
In a New Jersey case,17 service was attempted pursuant to New
Jersey court rules' 8 that authorize service by registered mail if other
methods are ineffective. The plaintiff made several attempts to serve
the defendant, who was in the military service at the time. He mailed
copies of the summons to the defendant's father and to an address
given by the defendant in an affidavit. This second letter was for-
warded to defendant's wife, but the defendant was not then living
with her. The court held that the plaintiff had not complied with the
statute requiring that the summons be "addressed to his dwelling house
or usual place of abode."3 9  The court recognized that the plaintiff
had made every possible effort to serve the defendant, and that the
defendant was consciously avoiding service. Nevertheless, literal com-
pliance with the statute was held to be a prerequisite to valid service.
This case, admittedly extreme, is indicative of a general judicial dispo-
sition for strict compliance with mailing provisions.
In an Arizona case 40 applying a mailing provision under a non-
resident motorist statute,41 the court emphasized the necessity for com-
plying with statutory requirements. Despite actual notice to the de-
fendant, indicated by his appearance in court to quash summons, the
court held that, in the absence of legal notice as required by the statute,
the service was ineffective. Like section 415.40, the Arizona statute
required the filing of a return receipt to insure actual service, but the
registered letter of notice was returned, marked "moved, left no ad-
dress." The court remarked:
['Jhe weight of authority seems to be that the copy of the reg-
istered letter must be received before service is complete. In other
words legal notice as opposed to actual knowledge is required in
order to comply with the substituted service provisions . ... 4
36. See text accompanying notes 3-4 supra.
37. Carlin v. Schuler, 89 NJ. Super. 366, 215 A.2d 56 (Law Div. 1965).
38. N.J. COURT RuLEs, Rule 4:4-(4)(j) (1969).
39. Id.
40. Stinson v. Johnson, 3 Ariz. App. 320, 414 P.2d 169 (1966).
41. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-501 to -503 (1956).
42. 3 Ariz. App. at 322, 414 P.2d at 171.
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Construction of California's Unique Provisions
Unlike statutes in other states,43 California's mailing provisions
are not designed for limited situations only. Essentially, service by
mail is equivalent to personal service. Anyone subject to personal serv-
ice is equally subject to service by mail in any civil action,44 and proper
service by mail is complete in itself. The most liberal feature of Cali-
fornia's new law is that service by mail need not be preceded by an
attempt to make a personal service. While an overwhelming majority
of states require attempted personal service before they allow other
means of service," California disregards the traditional reliance on
personal service and gives it no priority over service by mail. The
language of the chapter on service of process, read as a whole, resolves
any possible doubt about priorities. The provisions for personal service
and the two mailing provisions have substantially the same wording and
are formulated in the same permissive terms.46 In addition, when the
legislature in other sections of the act intended one means of service
to be attempted before another was authorized, it specifically provided
a priority.47  It therefore seems that any limit on the use of service by
mail would be extrinsic to the provisions themselves.
Due Process Considerations
A change in the law on service of summons as great as the change
affected by new sections 415.30 and 415.40 naturally raises the ques-
tion whether the new provisions satisfy the requirements of due process.
In this regard, it is helpful to distinguish the dual purposes of a sum-
mons. One writer helpfully points out:
43. See text accompanying notes 26-32 supra.
44. Those who may be served with summons include corporations, defunct cor-
porations, joint stock companies, unincorporated associations, public entities, minors,
wards, candidates for public office, and persons not otherwise specified in the article.
CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §§ 416.10-.90 (operative July 1, 1970).
45. E.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 308(3) (McKinney 1963).
46. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 415.10 (operative July 1, 1970) reads: "A summons
may be served by personal delivery .... ." (Emphasis added) New section 415.30
states: "A summons may be served by mail as provided in this section." (Emphasis
added) And section 415.40 reads: "A summons may be served on a person outside this
state in any manner provided by this article or by sending . . . the summons . . . air-
mail." (Emphasis added).
47. The provision for substitute service on an individual, CAL. CODE CrV. PROC.
§ 415.20(b) (operative July 1, 1970), reads: "If a copy of the summons and the com-
plaint cannot with reasonable diligence be personally delivered . . . a summons may
be served by leaving a copy [at the] usual place of abode ....... (Emphasis added).
Service by publication is only available if it appears by affidavit "that the party to be
served cannot with reasonable diligence be served in another manner specified in this
article . . . ." CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 415.50 (operative July 1, 1970) (emphasis
added).
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The function of service is two-fold:
(1) Service of the summons is a ceremonial act symbolic of the
court's assertion of power over the person of the defendant
or over a res;
(2) Service of the summons gives the defendant notice of the
commencement of the suit.
Every statute authorizing a mode of service of the summons is
drawn with these two functions in mind;
(1) The type of service must rest upon a basis recognized in
our jurisprudence justifying the court's assertion of power;
and
(2) The means of service must be reasonably calculated to af-
ford the defendant notice of the suit.48
Historically, a summons was akin to an arrest.49 Hence, assertion
of the power and notice were concurrent. Today, however, actual
physical power over the defendant is no longer required. In fact, the
physical power concept of a summons has been modified to the point
where it is no longer particularly helpful in analyzing modem problems
of jurisdiction. Granted, the court must exert power over the defend-
ant by issuing a summons in order to acquire personal jurisdiction, but
the foundation of its power over him lies not in the issuance of sum-
mons, but in the existence of a basis for jurisdiction before issuance
of summons. After noting that the power concept has been attenuated
beyond recognition, Professor James observes:
The question then arises whether the "power myth" should not be
discarded altogether in favor of the recognition of other relation-
ships or contacts with the state which make it fair and practically
convenient to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant even though
no power symbol is propitiated. This would mean that where
there are such relationships or contacts, jurisdiction might be ex-
ercised provided only that the requirements of reasonable notice
and opportunity to defend are met.50
He continues in a later section:
[A]n over-all trend may perhaps be seen toward more careful
scrutiny of notice as an insistence on power becomes more and
more attenuated. 51
In short, in analyzing whether service of summon satisfies due
process, it must be determined preliminarily whether there is a basis for
judicial jurisdiction. 52  Once a proper basis has been established,
compliance with due process requirements then depends on whether
notice is adequate, and it is at this point that mailing provisions should
48. H. WAcHrELL, NEW YORK UNDER THE C.P.L.R. 20 (1966).
49. W. BLUME, AMEIucAN CIVIL PROCEDURE 275-76 (1955).
50. F. JAMEs, CWi PROCEDURE 623 (1965).
51. Id. at 650.
52. New CAl. CODE Civ. PROC. § 410.10 (operative July 1, 1970) includes every
basis of judicial jurisdiction within constitutional limits.
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be scrutinized. Adequate provision for notice is absolutely essential be-
fore the court has the power to determine the rights of the parties. In
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,5 3 the Supreme Court
formulated the often quoted standard of notice required by due process:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in
any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested par-
ties of the pendency of the action and to afford them an oppor-
tunity to present their objections.54
The Supreme Court has recognized mail as a valid means of notice
in cases involving nonresident motorist statutes55 and foreign corpora-
tions.56 In the landmark case of International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton, 7 the Court observed, for example, in discussing the provision for
notice by mail to the defendants: "Nor can we say that the mailing of
the notice of suit to appellant by registered mail at its home office was
not reasonably calculated to apprise appellant of the suit."5  The
new California mailing statutes seem to satisfy the Mullane "due proc-
ess" requirements, but the context of the Supreme Court's discussion
should not be overlooked. In Mullane and International Shoe, the
Court held service by mail to be adequate where personal service was
impracticable.
California's new statutes go beyond this limited use and equate
mail service with personal service. However, the statute is formulated
to insure actual notice to the defendant, comparable to personal service.
Section 415.30 requires the person served to return an acknowledgment.
If he fails to execute the acknowledgment he is responsible for the cost
of other service, but the service is ineffective. No judgment can be
rendered against the defendant on the basis of mere mailing of a
summons, for proof of service requires the receipt of the acknowledge-
ment." In the absence of forgery, mistake, or ignorance, then, actual
notice is guaranteed by this provision." ° Actual notice to the defend-
ant is also virtually assured under section 415.40. The section pro-
vides for registered or certified airmail, and proof of service requires
that there shall be "evidence satisfactory to the court establishing actual
53. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
54. Id. at 315.
55. E.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
56. E.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 320.
59. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 417.10(a) (operative July 1, 1970).
60. See id. § 473.5, containing provisions for setting aside a judgment when
notice was not received.
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delivery to the person to be served, by a signed return receipt or other
evidence. ... 61
The due process requirement of notice to the defendant thus seems
to be satisfied by the two mailing provisions. Undoubtedly, the de-
fendant's interests will also be protected by the courts. Service by mail
is a significant departure from former procedure, and it is likely that
the courts will require strict compliance with the statutory requirements
and convincing proof of actual service.
Mechanical Operation of the Statute
Apart from due process considerations, there are practical prob-
lems affecting the workability of the new provisions. Section 415.40,
the out-of-state mailing provision, will probably function as smoothly
as its "long-arm" prototypes. 62 The future of section 415.30 is more
difficult to anticipate. The success of this provision depends upon
the cooperation and good faith of the person being served, for he
must be willing to voluntarily return the acknowledgment. Without
substantial cooperation, the new mailing provision will cause wasted
court time in litigating the preliminary squabble over whether the
defendant is liable for the cost of service. 3 The law's only sanction
is economic, and it is doubtful that this minimal threat will intimi-
date a reluctant defendant. Nevertheless, even though service by
mail may not be an effective means to serve an elusive defendant, it
will provide a convenient and economical means of serving a willing
defendant. It is impossible to evaluate the new provisions prop-
erly until they have been used. At the very least, the increased
convenience to plaintiffs should outweigh any added burden on the
courts.
Conclusion
California has boldly met contemporary needs without ignoring
traditional concepts of fairness. Service by mail is obviously more
convenient and economical than personal service; and in providing a
less time consuming alternative to personal service, the legislature has
not sacrificed the interests of the defendant. Typical of the changing
character of society, the concept of jurisdiction is expanding, and as it
expands the mechanics of procedure must be as flexible as the society
itself. Only time will reveal the wisdom of the new mailing provisions;
61. Id. § 417.20(1) (emphasis added).
62. CAL. CoRp. CoDE H§ 3301, 6501-02; CAL. PuB. UTIm. CODE § 21414; CAL.
VEH. CODE § 17454-55.
63. See text accompanying notes 3-4 supra.
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but they seem to be a welcome and needed addition to the accepted
modes of service.
Sarah Pratt Ross*
* Member, Second Year Class.
